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Agency Theory and Its 
Application to Small Firms: 
Evidence from the Swedish 
Venture Capital Market
Hans Landstrom
The research in small firms financing is characterized by a lack of a theoretical 
framework. One basic assumption in this study is that agency theory can provide 
an essential framework to explain the interaction between informal and formal 
venture capitalists and their portfolio firms. Five hypotheses generated from 
agency theory are formulated andjested on 62 firms backed by informal venture 
capitalists and 145 firms backed by formal venture capitalists. The theoretical 
conclusion is that agency theory does not provide a satisfactory framework to 
explain either the informal venture capitalist’s, nor the formal venture capitalist’s 
relationship to their portfolio firms. Therefore, more exploratory research must 
be done to develop a theory of finance which will be applicable in the small firms 
situation.
I. INTRODUCTION
The research in small firms financing is characterized by a lack of a 
theoredcal framework. The theory of modern corporate finance is developed 
mainly with large firms in mind. Ang [1] emphasizes that small firms have 
unique characteristics. For example, the owners have undiversified personal 
portfolios, the first generation owners are entrepreneural and prone to risk 
taking, the management team is not complete, the small firms experience 
high cost of market and institutional imperfections, and relationships with 
stockholders are less formal. These differences between large and small firms 
could generate a different set of financial problems in small firms, or cause 
the entrepreneurs in the small firms to look at the same financial problems 
in a different manner.
Against this background, it is important to develop or find theories 
which are valid in the small firms situation. One of the assumptions in this 
study is that agency theory can provide a helpful framework to explain the 
cooperation between venture capitalists and their portfolio firms.
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Why is agency theory interesting in this respect? The following reasons 
can be mentioned:
•  Agency theory has been developed on a relatively high level of 
abstraction, but the theory is to a limited extent tested in empirical 
situations.
•  Researchers in the field of agency theory regard small firms as one area 
where studies can provide most of the leverage for agency theory [6].
•  Agency costs are thought to be a major impediment to small firms in 
their attempts to obtain external financing [2, 13, 21].
•  Some of the assumptions in the agency theory sound intuitively 
appealing and relevant in the small firms situation. For example, the 
high level of asymmetric information [2], and the fact that 
entrepreneurs are not motivated to disclose information due to fears 
that it might be used against them, so-called information impactedness 
[14].
•  Studies of the venture capital market in the US have shown that the 
agency theory could be a helpful theory to explain the interaction 
between formal venture capitalists and entrepreneurs [22], and that 
monitoring financial and operation performance is one of the most 
time-consuming activities of formal venture capitalists [15].
The aim of the study is to test the applicability of agency theory to small 
firms. The empirical material in the study is derived from the Swedish 
venture capital market.
The term “venture capital” is often misused, and there is no universal 
definition [16, 24]. However, essential to the definition is that the venture 
capitalists provide risk capital (equity and near-equity capital), the 
investments are made in small unlisted firms, and the commitments are for 
a limited period of time.
The concept “informal venture capitalists” will be defined as external 
private individuals who provide risk capital directly to small unlisted firms. 
The definition of informal venture capitalists in this study is broader than 
the definition of informal investors used in studies in the US [9, 25] and the 
UK [17]. Furthermore, the concept “formal venture capitalists” refers to 
companies (with no strong connection to private individuals’ capital) which 
provide risk capital to small unlisted firms.
The paper is organized into seven sections. In section II a review of the 
agency theory is presented. Section III presents the hypotheses generated from 
agency theory. Section IV describes the data collecting process and the 
variables used in the study. Some characteristics of the firms surveyed are
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presented in section V. In section VI the empirical findings are presented 
and in the final section some theoretical conclusions are drawn.
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II. AGENCY THEORY
In this section the general assumptions in the agency theory will be presented, 
and the external investors’ possibilities to monitor the entrepreneur’s 
behavior will be described.
In general, agency theory is related to the problem that occurs when 
cooperating parties have different goals and a division of labor. Specifically, 
the agency theory focuses on the relationship in which one or more persons 
(the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some work 
on their behalf [13]. The basic premise of agency theory is that both principals 
and agents are assumed to be rational economic-maximizing individuals. 
Therefore, the separation of ownership and control will result in decisions 
by the agent which are not always in the principal’s best interest and there 
will arise costs (agency costs) of bringing the agent’s behavior into line. For 
example, costs arise which are incurred by the principals when monitoring 
and controlling the behavior of the agent (so-called monitoring costs), and 
costs incurred by the agent in demonstrating compliance with the wishes 
of the principal (so-called bonding costs).
The unit of analysis in the agency theory is the contract between the 
principal and agent. These contracts (written and unwritten) specify the 
rights of the agent, performance criteria on which agents are evaluated, and 
the payoff functions they face [8]. Especially, there are two problems that 
the agency theory tries to solve. The first is the problem that arises when 
the goals of the principal and agent conflict and it is difficult or expensive 
for the principal to verify what the agent is actually doing. The second is 
the problem that arises when the principal and agent have different attitudes 
toward risk, which can lead to different preferred actions.
The agency theory has its roots in information economics, and the theory 
has developed along two lines; positivist and principal-agent research [12]. The 
two approaches share a common unit of analysis and use the same agency cost 
minimizing tautology, but differ in their mathematical strictness. Positivist 
research is less mathematical and more empirically oriented than principal- 
agent research. The positivist researchers have focused mainly on the principal- 
agent relationship between owners and managers of large corporations [e.g.,
7, 8, 13], whereas principal-agent researchers are concerned with a general 
theory of the principal-agent relationship [e.g., 4, 11].
One of the core issues in the agency theory concerns the principals’ 
possibilities to monitor the agent’s behavior. Monitoring refers to the
principals’ ability to determine whether the agents have lived up to the 
provisions of the contract and to prevent the agent’s misuse of assets due 
to conflicts of interest. In Jensen-Meckling’s [13] definition, monitoring 
refers to more than just measuring or observing the behavior of the agent. 
It also includes efforts to “control” the behavior of the agent through budget 
restrictions, operating rules, etc.
In the case were the principal does not have complete information about 
the agent’s behavior, as in the case of external investors, two options exist 
[5]; to put the agent’s behavior under surveillance (e.g., through reporting 
procedures, and board of directors), or to reward the agent based on outcomes 
(e.g., profitability).
Following such reasoning Ouchi [19, 20] suggests two underlying 
monitoring strategies. The strategy can be either behavior or outcome based. 
The behavior-based strategy refers to an agreement between the principal 
and the agent which concerns a certain behavior that in some way will be 
rewarded, whereas outcome-based strategy refers to the principal’s 
measurement of certain outcomes and the reward will be based on this 
measurement. According to Ouchi [19], the choice between the strategies 
depends on two dimensions; knowledge of transformation process and 
availability of output measures. To use a behavior-based strategy, that is, 
to continuously observe the agent’s behavior, the principal requires a causal 
knowledge of what is required to attain a desired outcome. When the 
principal uses outcome-based strategy, for example, to measure the agent’s 
attained results, the transformation process need not be known at all, but 
a reliable and valid measure of the desired outputs must be available.
III. HYPOTHESES
In this section the hypotheses generated from agency theory will be presented. 
The hypotheses emanate from Ouchi’s reasoning regarding different 
monitoring strategies. As a monitoring variable I will use the concept “active 
involvement” which includes a high frequency of contacts between the 
investor and entrepreneur, and more operational involvement by the investor 
in the portfolio firm.
The characteristics of the portfolio firm can be expected to affect the 
venture capitalist’s way of monitoring the entrepreneur. According to Ouchi 
[19] a more behavior-based strategy will be used in situations where the 
availability of output measures are low. This is the situation in highly 
innovative firms and in young firms. Furthermore, high innovation firms 
may involve technology that is not well understood by the venture capitalist. 
The information asymmetries increase the threat of opportunism which leads
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to more active involvement. In young firms the risk of failure is high. This 
also leads to a need for frequent contacts and more operational involvement. 
In accordance with this reasoning the following hypotheses can be 
formulated:
HI: The higher the innovation level of the firm, the more the venture 
capitalist will rely on more active involvement.
H2: The younger the firm, the more the venture capitalist will rely 
on more active involvement.
Environmental characteristics will also affect the monitoring behavior. 
As the environment becomes more variable, information will have to be 
processed more frequently. Under conditions of high variability, 
performance evaluation becomes more difficult [13] and more evaluation 
mechanisms are likely to evolve [3]. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that 
variability in the environment will force a more active involvement. The 
hypothesis is:
H3: The more variable the environment becomes, the more the venture 
capitalist will rely on more active involvement.
The effects of ownership on managerial incentives are one of the core 
issues of agency theory. One suggestion is that an entrepreneur who owns 
a large share of the firm will require little monitoring, because his incentives 
will be in line with those of outside owners. Furthermore, as the ownership 
of the outside investors increases, the need for monitoring will increase. The 
reasons for this are; (I) the risk that the entrepreneur will consume the firm’s 
resources will increase, and (II) the investors exposure to business risks 
increases as the equity stake increases. As a result, the venture capitalist will 
take a more active role in the firm when his ownership level is high. This 
reasoning leads to the following hypothesis:
H4: The lower the relative ownership level of the entrepreneur, the 
more the venture capitalist will rely on more active involvement.
The venture capitalist’s knowledge about the portfolio firm’s 
transformation process, here defined as the knowledge of the firm’s market 
and technology, will affect the monitoring behavior. According to Ouchi 
[19] a more behavior-based strategy will be used in situations where the principal’s
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Table 1 
Hypotheses in the Study
Monitoring Variables
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Frequency of Contacts Operational Involvement
HI Innovation Level + +
H2 Age of the Firm + -1-
H3 Environment Variability + -1-
H4 Entrepreneur’s Ownership — —
H5 Venture Capitalist’s Knowledge + +
knowledge of the tranformation process is good. This will give rise to the 
following hypothesis:
H5: The more the venture capitalist knows about the portfolio firm’s 
transformation process, the more the venture capitalist will rely 
on more active involvement.
In Table 1 the hypothesized impact of the context on the venture 
capital—entrepreneur relationships is summarized.
IV. METHOD
In this section the data collecting process and the variables used in the study 
will be presented. Furthermore, the limitations of the study will be discussed. 
The study is based on two surveys, one of firms backed by informal venture 
capitalists and one survey of firms backed by formal venture capitalists.
Survey of firms backed by informal venture capitalists
This part of the study was carried out during the spring of 1991, and 
is based on a survey of manufacturing and technology-based firms in Sweden. 
Three geographic areas in southern Sweden and 11 science parks were 
selected for the study. The criteria for the sample in the three geographic 
areas were manufacturing firms with up to 100 employees. The sample frame 
was composed of a random sampling from the data base of the Postal Office 
(PAR). The science parks were studied through a full-scale survey of the firms 
located at the science parks.
In total 1,258 firms were included in the sample frame. The 
questionnaire was mailed to the CEO’s of the firms, with a reminder via 
telephone after two weeks and a postal reminder after additionally one week. 
Of the 1,258 firms, 47 claimed that they were not independent juridical firms,
not manufacturing firms or firms with over 100 employees. Sixteen 
questionnaires were sent back by the postal services, and it was assumed that 
those firms had gone out of business. Thirty-one firms reported that they 
had discontinued their operation or had gone into bankruptcy. The effective 
sample frame was thus 1,164 firms, and of these 627 firms were not heard 
from, 32 firms sent back incomplete questionnaires or questionnaires that 
were not filled in, and 505 sent back questionnaires that were completely 
filled in. Thus, the response rate is 505/1,164, or 43%.
The results show inter alia that banks, as might be expected, are the 
most commonly used external investor, followed by supplier and leasing/ 
factoring companies. It is interesting to note that informal venture capitalists 
are used in 62 or 12% of the firms, which is suprisingly high. The analyses 
in this paper are based on those 62 firms which have informal venture 
capitalists as (part) owner.
Survey of firms backed by formal venture capitalists
In this survey the data is based on a questionnaire sent to CEO’s in firms 
backed by formal venture capitalists in Sweden. The survey was carried out 
in the spring of 1990. The sample frame was designed from the venture 
capital data base of the Swedish National Board for Industrial and Technical 
Development, and from annual reports of venture capital companies. In total 
536 portfolio firms were traced. Commitments which involved one venture 
capital company investing in another venture capital company were 
disregarded. The fact that one portfolio firm may have several venture capital 
companies as (part) owner has also been taken into account. To offset the 
risk that the questionnaire might be filled in by representatives of the venture 
capital company, portfolio firms with the same address as the venture capital 
company were excluded. The final list of portfolio firms used in the survey 
included 380 firms.
The questionnaire was mailed to the portfolio firms, with a reminder 
after three weeks. Of the 380 firms, answers were obtained from 183. Of these, 
there were 17 firms with more than 100 employees. Thus, the effective sample 
frame was 363 firms. 21 questionnaires were returned “blank” and 145 
questionnaires could be used for analyses. The percentage of answers was 
thus 145/363, or 40%.
Variables used in the surveys
The variables that have been used in the study were operationalized in 
the following way (Table 2).
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Table 2
Overview of Variables Used in the Study
Variables Operationalization
Innovation Level Biomodel scale (0 =  Old product on the market and 
1 =  New product on the market)
Age of the Firm Year of Start
Environment Variability Five point scale (1 =  Small changes to 5 =  Large changes) in 
the dimensions, market, technology, competition and 
supliers
Entrepreneur’s Ov^nership 
Share
Percent
Venture Capitalist’s Five point scale (1 =  Very limited extent to 5 =  Very large
Knowledge extent) in the dimensions, market and technology
Frequency of Contacts Five point scale (1 =  Almost never, 2 =  When needed, 
3 =  Monthly, 4 =  Weekly and 5 =  Daily)
Operational Involvement Seven point scale (1 =  No active cooperation, 2 =  Economic 
reports, 3 =  Work on board, 4 =  Ad hoc when needed,
5 =  Continuous informal contacts, 6 =  Involvement in 
operation [part time] and 7 =  Involvement in operation 
[full time])
Limitations of the study
There are several factors which potentially restrict the conclusions which 
may be drawn. First, one such limitation is the size of the samples, including 
the survey of firms backed by informal venture capitalists as well as the survey 
of firms backed by formal venture capitalists. Larger samples would have 
been preferred for statistical analyses and generalization purposes. Secondly, 
the most serious limitation refers to the operationalizing of the variables. 
Some of the variables are measured through single item measures due to the 
desire to get an acceptable response rate. This can be discussed since the 
contents in some of the variables are more comprehensive than what can 
be included in a single item measure. Furthermore, the construct validity 
for separate variables can be discussed. For example, the assumption behind 
the variable “venture capitalist’s knowledge about the portfolio firm’s 
transformation process” is that this knowledge will be reflected in the venture 
capitalist’s provision of resources in the dimensions, market, and technology. 
Finally, the broad definition of “informal venture capitalists” makes it 
difficult to compare the results in this study with studies of informal investors 
in the US and the UK.
V. SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF THE FIRMS SURVEYED
In this section the firms backed by formal and informal venture capitalists’ 
will be described.
The character of the firms
The survey of firms backed by formal venture capitalists shov^ed that 
44% of the firms were started during the 1980’s. The average number of 
employees were 32 (median 25 employees), and 22% of the firms had less than
10 employees. Twenty-two percent of the firms had a principal product that 
was “completely new on the market” when it was launched.
The average number of owners in the firms were 2.7 owners. The average 
share owned by the CEO was 16% (median 0%), and the formal venture 
capitalist was majority owner in 59% of the cases.
Corresponding results in the survey of firms backed by informal venture 
capitalists showed that 69% of the firms were started during the 1980’s. The 
firms in this survey are smaller. The average number of employees was 16 
employees (median 11 employees), and 44% had less than 10 employees. 
Among the informal venture capitalists’ portfolio firms 49% stated that the 
firm had a principal product that was “completely new on the market” when 
it was launched.
On average there were 9.5 owners in the firms. The average share owned 
by the CEO was 30% (median 26%), and the informal venture capitalists were 
majority owners in 49% of the firms.
Due to differences in the sample frame it is difficult to make any 
conclusions regarding the investment patterns between informal and formal 
venture capitalists.
The Cooperation Between the Venture 
Capitalists and the Portfolio Firms
Of course, the differences in the sample frame also influence the 
possibilities to make comparisons between the formal and informal venture 
capitalists’ way of cooperating with their portfolio firms. However, in both 
cases the relationship is formed between parties that are rather close. The 
distance between the formal venture capitalist and the portfolio firm was 
less than 50 km in 51% of the cases. Corresponding results for the informal 
venture capitalists were 60% of the cases.
The frequency of contacts between the venture capitalists and the 
portfolio firms are rather high for both formal and informal venture 
capitalists. Forty-eight percent of the respondents in the formal venture
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Table 3 
Provision o£ Resources
Average Values on a Five Point Scale
Formal Venture Informal Venture 
Capitalists Capitalists
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Acting as a Sounding Board 3.1 3.7
Wider Range of Contacts 2.9 3.4
Facilitated Contacts with Interested Third 2.7 3.1
Parties
Professionalizing of the Portfolio Firm 2.8 3.1
Financial Expertise 3.4 3.1
Expertise in Negotiating and Contract-Making 2.6 3.1
Market Expertise 1.8 2.6
Technological/Production Expertise 1.4 2.5
capitalists survey and 53% in the informal venture capitalists survey indicated 
contacts some time/s every day or week.
There are some differences in the way of organizing the cooperation 
between the venture capitalists and the portfolio firms. The formal venture 
capitalists seem to rely more on financial reports and consultancy work in 
the portfolio firms, whereas informal venture capitalists are more actively 
involved in operations. Both formal and informal venture capitalists work 
actively on board meetings and by informal contacts with the entrepreneurs.
Apart from capital, the venture capitalists provide different kinds of 
expertise. This is primairily in the form of acting as a sounding board, 
professionalizing of the portfolio firm, financial expertise, and expertise in 
negotiating and contract-making. A comparison between formal and informal 
venture capitalists shows that the informal venture capitalists provide expertise 
to a larger extent on almost every studied variable (see Table 3).
The portfolio firms’ expectations of the cooperation with the venture 
capitalists have in many cases been fulfilled. Seventy-four percent of the 
CEO’s in firms backed by informal venture capitalists are of the opinion that 
their expectations had been realized to a large or very large extent. 
Corresponding results for the entrepreneurs in firms backed by formal 
venture capitalists were 54%.
VI. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
In this section the five hypotheses are tested. The effects of the independent 
variables on the venture capitalists frequency of contacts and operational 
involvement are analyzed.
Table 4
The Impact of Independent Variables on Frequency of Contacts
Dependent Variable: Frequency of Contacts
Formal Venture Informal Venture
Capitalists Capitalists
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Independent
variables Hypothesis Prediction
Beta
Value Significance
Beta
Value Significance
Innovation level HI + -0.19 -0.54 Sign.
Age of the firm H2 + 0.00 0.01
Environment
variability H3 + 0.02 -0.35 Sign.
Entrepreneur’s
ownership H4 — -0.01 0.01
Venture
capitalist’s
knov l^edge H5 + 0.23 0.29 **
R' (adj) 0.19 0.33
F 5.04*** 5.56***
n 89 46
Notes: Level of Significance 
+  p < 0 .1 0  
• p <  0.05 
** p<0.01  
•** p + 0.001
By way of introduction the correlations between the variables used as 
independent variables should be examined. The primary interest is to 
examine the extent to which multicollinearity can be expected to confound 
the results of the regression analyses conducted to test the hypotheses.
The result of the correlations shows that none of correlations are above
0.50. The highest value in both surveys is between the variables innovation 
level and age of the firm (r — 0.23 in the formal venture capitalist survey, 
and r =  0.32 in the informal venture capitalist survey). This indicates that 
the variables are tapping different aspects of the venture capitalist— 
entrepreneur relationship, and it appears that multicollinearity should not 
be a serious threat to the regression analysis.
A basic assumption in the study is that venture capitalists attempt to 
manage the agency risks inherent in a particular firm through the level of 
their involvement. Table 4 presents the results of regressing the five 
independent variables against frequency of contacts in the venture 
capitalist—entrepreneur dyad.
The results in Table 4 show that only one of the five hypotheses is 
supported. As predicted, the frequency of contacts increases when the venture
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Table 5
The Impact of Independent Variables on Operational Involvement
Dependent Variable: Operational Involvement
Formal Venture 
Capitalists
Informal Venture 
Capitalists
Independent
Variables Hypothesis Prediction
Beta
Value Significance
Beta
Value Significance
Innovation level HI + 0.30 -0.60 Sign.
Age of the firm H2 + -0.01 0.01
Environment
variability H3 + -0.19 -0.11
Entrepreneur’s
ownership H4 — 0.00 -0.00
Venture
capitalist’s
knowledge H5 + 0.52 0.39 *
R' (adj) 0.11 0.13
F 3.33** 2.46*
n 93 51
Notes: Level of Significance 
+  p < 0 . 1 0  
* p <  0.05 
** p <  0.01 
*** p +  0.001
capitalist has more knowledge about the portfolio firm’s transformation 
process (H5). None of the other hypotheses are supported. On the contrary, 
for the informal venture capitalists there is a significant relationship between 
higher innovation level, respectively higher environment variability, and 
lower frequency of contacts (HI and H3). Also, the results do not give support 
for the hypotheses concerning a positive relationship between young firms 
and a high frequency of contacts (H2), or a negative relationship between 
the entrepreneur’s ownership level and the frequency of contacts (H4).
The predicted direction of the hypotheses is identical when operational 
involvement is used as a dependent variable. Table 5 presents the results of 
the regression analysis testing the hypotheses regarding the effects of the 
independent variables on the venture capitalist’s operational involvement in 
the portfolio firms.
The results for the hypotheses regarding the venture capitalists 
operational involvement in the portfolio firms show similar results as for 
the frequency of contacts. Only the variable “venture capitalist’s knowledge” 
(H5) is significantly related to operational involvement. The variables, age 
of the firm (H2), environment variability (H3), and entrepreneur’s ownership
(H4) seem to contribute little to explaining variations in the operational 
involvement by the venture capitalists in their portfolio firms. It is interesting 
to note that high innovation level is related to more operational involvement 
by the formal venture capitalists, but less operational involvement by the 
informal venture capitalists (HI).
To summarize, it appears that only one variable generated from agency 
theory helps to explain the active involvement by the venture capitalists in 
their portfolio firms. More knowledge from the venture capitalist about the 
portfolio firm’s transformation process seems to support higher frequency 
of contacts and operational involvement. It is also interesting to note the 
difference between informal and formal venture capitalists in the treatment 
of portfolio firms with a high innovation level. In these situations, the 
informal venture capitalists seem to be considerably more passive than the 
formal venture capitalists.
The weak relationships between the variables generated from agency 
theory and the venture capitalists’ involvement in their portfolio firms may 
be explained by the differences in the venture capitalists’ ownership level. 
Therefore, a comparison was made between those firms with majority 
ownership by venture capitalists against those with minority ownership. 
However, the result shows no major differences between minority and 
majority owned portfolio firms. Thus, the results do not strongly support 
the assumption that the venture capitalists take a more active role in the 
portfolio firms when their ownership level is high.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
This section summarizes the conclusions emerging from the regression 
analyses testing of the formulated hypotheses. The section is divided into 
two subsections; theoretical implications and discussion.
Theoretical implications
This study used agency theory as the theoretical framework to study the 
relationship between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs. It is interesting 
to note that the agency theory does not seem to provide a satisfactory 
explanation for the venture capitalist’s interaction with the entrepreneurs. 
This holds true for formal as well as informal venture capitalists. The results 
are contrary to what was expected, and the results are especially interesting 
for the formal venture capitalists, since the assumptions in agency theory 
could be expected to be more valid in the relationship between formal venture 
capitalists and their portfolio firms. It is possible that the agency theory is
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not valid in the relationship between venture capitalists and their portfolio 
firms due to the following reasons:
I. The agency theory is based on the assumption that both principals 
and agents are rational economic-maximizing individuals. This 
does not hold for the entrepreneur or the informal venture capitalist. 
Studies have shown that entrepreneurs are often driven by other than 
purely economical motives. Also, studies of informal venture 
capitalists in the US and the UK show that they do not always see 
the monetary rewards as the most essential.
II. The agency theory assumes that the principal building control 
mechanism is to prevent opportunistic behavior from the agent, 
which implies a “negative” relationship between the principal and 
agent. The relationship between the venture capitalist and 
entrepreneur usually has a more “positive” character, where the 
interaction is based on support and mutual trust. In many cases the 
control mechanism functions as a dysfunctional factor with lowering 
trust between the venture capitalist and entrepreneur, which impedes 
open communication, etc.
III. The agency theory assumes that there is an information asymmetry 
between the principal and agent which facilitates the agent’s 
opportunistic behavior. The negotiations between the venture 
capitalist and entrepreneur, and the personal relationship between 
them can result in less information asymmetries and less 
opportunistic behavior, and therefore substitute monitoring 
solutions.
My conclusion is that the agency theory is not applicable in the 
interaction between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs. More exploratory 
research must be done to develop a theory of finance which will be applicable 
in the small firms situation.
Discussion
Finally, some reflections regarding the differences between informal and 
formal venture capitalists. As mentioned earlier, the differences in the sample 
frame imply that a complete comparison cannot be obtained. However, some 
observations can be made.
The results in the study indicate that informal venture capitalists have 
a tendency to invest in young firms and technology-based firms to a larger 
extent than formal venture capitalists. This corresponds with results in the 
US [10, 23, 25] and in the UK [18].
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In addition to the differences in the investment pattern there seems to 
exist differences in the ownership structure in the portfolio firms. Firms 
backed by informal venture capitalists seem to have a weaker ownership 
structure, with a large number of owners and where each informal venture 
capitalist has a small ownership share in the firm. This implies that the 
cooperation must be based on a mutual trust between the venture capitalist 
and entrepreneur. On the other hand, firms backed by formal venture 
capitalists seem to have a stronger ownership structure with few owners and 
where the venture capitalist in many cases is the majority owner. The 
consequence is that the formal venture capitalist to a larger extent can rely 
on its ownership power in their cooperation with the portfolio firm.
Of course, the differences in investment pattern and ownership structure 
influence the conditions of the cooperation between the venture capitalists 
and portfolio firm. The results in the study indicate that the informal venture 
capitalists provide more expertise to their portfolio firms compared to the 
formal venture capitalists. However, the impression is that informal and 
formal venture capitalists react differently to changes in the portfolio firms. 
The formal venture capitalists react quicker and more resolute. They are 
more objective in their judgements, and economic motives guide their 
decisions. Informal venture capitalists react less powerfully, they are more 
subjective in their judgements, and they must to a larger extent rely on the 
entrepreneur’s statements and actions. Therefore, the informal venture 
capitalists appear to provide less assistance with short term changes and/ 
or problems in the portfolio firms than the formal venture capitalists.
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